

Federal Aviation Administration – [Regulations and Policies](#)  
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Transport Airplane and Engine Issue Area  
Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group

**Task 1 – Brakes Installed on Transport Category Airplanes**

## **Task Assignment**

**Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee; Transport Airplane and Engine Issues**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of establishment of the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group.

**SUMMARY:** Notice is given of the establishment of the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). This notice informs the public of the activities of the ARAC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Michael H. Borfitt, Assistant Executive Director, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, Transport Airplane and Engine Issues, FAA Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (617) 238-7110, fax (617) 238-7199.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On January 22, 1991 (56 FR 2190), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The committee provides advice and recommendations to the FAA Administrator, through the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, on the full range of the FAA's rulemaking activities with respect to aviation-related issues.

In order to develop such advice and recommendations, the ARAC may choose to establish working groups to which specific tasks are assigned. Such working groups are comprised of experts from those organizations having an interest in the assigned tasks. A working group member need not be a representative of the full committee. Recently the ARAC established the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group.

The FAA announced at the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)-Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Harmonization Conference in Toronto, Canada June 2-5, 1992 that it would consolidate within the ARAC structure an ongoing objective to "harmonize" the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) and the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).

**Tasks**

The Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group is charged with recommending to the ARAC new or revised requirements for approval of brakes installed on transport category airplanes. The product of this exercise is intended to be a harmonized standard, acceptable to both the FAA

and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA).

**Reports**

The Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group should develop and present to the ARAC:

1. A recommended work plan for completion of the task, including the rationale supporting such plan, for consideration at the meeting of the ARAC to consider transport airplane and engine issues held following publication of this notice;
2. A detailed conceptual presentation on the proposed recommendation(s), prior to proceeding with the work stated in item 3. below;
3. A draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), with supporting economic and other required analyses, and/or any other related guidance material or collateral documents the working group determines to be appropriate; or, if new or revised requirements or compliance methods are not recommended, a draft report stating the rationale for not making such recommendations; and
4. A status report at each meeting of the ARAC held to consider transport airplane and engine issues.

**Participation in Working Group Task**

An individual who has expertise in the subject matter and wishes to become a member of the working group should write to the person listed under the caption **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** expressing that desire, describing his or her interest in the task and stating the expertise he or she would bring to the working group. The request will be reviewed with the assistant chairman and working group leader, and the individual will be advised whether or not the request can be accommodated.

The Secretary of Transportation has determined that the information and use of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee are necessary in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the FAA by law. Meetings of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee will be open to the public, except as authorized by section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Meetings of the working group will not be open to the public, except to the extent that individuals with an interest and expertise are selected to participate. No public announcement of working group meetings will be made.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 3, 1994.

**Chris A. Christie,**

*Executive Director, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.*

[FR Doc. 94-14146 Filed 6-9-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

## **Recommendation Letter**



*clw*

May 1, 1998

Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration  
800 Independence Avenue  
Washington, DC 20591

*Action: AICM*

Attn: Mr. Guy S. Gardner, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification

Subject: ARAC Rulemaking Package

Dear Guy:

The ARAC Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group (TAEIG) is pleased to forward the attached rulemaking package and associated advisory material to the FAA for further action. This package has been approved by the TAEIG and contains proposals for the revision of FAR sections 25.731 and 25.735 (Standards for Brake Certification) and sections 25.613 (Material Strength Properties and Design Values), proposed Advisory Circulars and a proposed Technical Standard Order (TSO-C 135).

TAEIG requests that the FAA consider tasking the disposition any substantive comments relating to sections 25.731 and 25.735 to the Brake System Harmonization Working Group and comments relating to section 25.613 to the General Structures Harmonization Working Group. Please feel free to contact us if we can be of assistance in any way.

Sincerely,

*Craig R. Bolt*

Craig R. Bolt  
Assistant Chair, ARAC TAEIG  
boltcr@pweh.com  
(Ph: 860-565-9348/Fax: 860-565-5794)

CRB/amr

Attachment (to addressee only)

cc: Bob Amberg  
Bob Benjamin  
Jean Casciano  
Brenda Courtney  
Herb Lancaster  
Stu Miller

## **Acknowledgement Letter**

JUN 3 1998

Mr. Craig R. Bolt  
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee  
Pratt & Whitney  
400 Main Street  
East Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Craig:


Thank you for your May 1 letter transmitting recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). You provided proposed rulemakings for the revision of sections 25.613, 25.731, and 25.735 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, proposed advisory circulars to the associated rule proposals, and a proposed technical standard order (TSO-C-135). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accepts these recommendations provided there are no legal or other reasons why we cannot adopt them.

The complete rulemaking package will be reviewed and coordinated within the FAA and the Offices of the Secretary of Transportation and Management and Budget, if appropriate. The FAA will publish the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for public comment as soon as the coordination process is complete. The proposed advisory circulars and TSO will also be made available for public comment when the coordination process is complete. We will make every effort to handle these recommendations expeditiously. Although no decision will be made at this time, the FAA will look at tasking the disposition of comments to the working groups at the end of the comment periods.

I would like to thank the ARAC, and particularly the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group and the General Structures Harmonization Working Group for their actions on these tasks.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By  
Margaret Gilligan



Guy S. Gardner  
Associate Administrator for  
Regulation and Certification

## **Recommendation**



[4910-13]

DRAFT

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

12/12/97

Federal Aviation Administration

[14 CFR Part 25]

[Docket No.     ; Notice No.     ]

RIN 2120-

**Revision of Braking Systems Airworthiness Standards to Harmonize with European Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes.**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking.

**SUMMARY:** The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to revise the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes to harmonize braking systems design and test requirements with standards proposed for the European Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR). These proposals were developed in cooperation with the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe and the U.S. and European aviation industry through the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), and are intended to benefit the public interest by standardizing certain requirements, concepts, and procedures contained in the airworthiness standards without reducing, but potentially enhancing, the current level of safety.

**DATES:** Comments must be received on or before [ insert date 90 days after date of publication in the Federal Register ].

**ADDRESSES:** Comments on this notice may be mailed in triplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-200), Docket No.     , 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; or delivered in triplicate to: Room 915G, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591. Comments delivered must be marked Docket No.     . Comments may also be sent electronically to the following internet address: 9-NPRM-CMTS@faa.dot.gov.

Comments may be examined in Room 915G weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In addition, the FAA is maintaining an information docket of comments in the Transport Airplane Directorate (ANM-100), Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056. Comments in the information docket may be examined weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mahinder K. Wahi, FAA, Propulsion/Mechanical/Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-112, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2142; facsimile (425) 227-1320.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Comments Invited**

Interested persons are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments relating to any environmental, energy, or economic impact that might result from adopting the proposals contained in this notice are invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost estimates. Commenters should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and submit comments in triplicate to the Rules Docket address above. All comments received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of comments received. All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket, both before and after the comment period closing date, for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Persons wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which is stated:

"Comments to Docket No. . " The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

#### **Availability of the NPRM**

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-3339), the Federal Register's electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 202-512-1661), or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: 202-267-5948).

Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at <http://www.faa.gov> or the Federal Register's web page at [http://www.access.gpo.gov/su\\_docs](http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs) for access to recently published rulemaking documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this notice by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; or by calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket number of this notice. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future rulemaking documents should also request a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes the application procedure.

#### **Background**

The airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes are contained in 14 CFR part 25. Manufacturers of transport category airplanes must show that each airplane they produce of a different type design complies with the relevant standards of part 25. These standards apply to airplanes manufactured within the U.S. for use by U.S.-registered operators and to airplanes manufactured in other countries and imported under a bilateral airworthiness agreement.

In Europe, the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) were developed by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to provide a common set of airworthiness standards for use within the European aviation community. The airworthiness standards for European type certification of transport category airplanes, JAR-25, are based on part 25 of Title 14. Airplanes certificated to the JAR-25 standards, including airplanes manufactured in the U.S. for export to Europe, receive type certificates that are accepted by the aircraft certification authorities of 23 European countries.

Although part 25 and JAR-25 are very similar, they are not identical. Differences between the FAR and the JAR can result in substantial additional costs when airplanes are type certificated to both standards. These additional costs, however, frequently do not bring about an increase in safety. For example, part 25 and JAR-25 may use different means to accomplish the same safety intent. In this case, the manufacturer is usually burdened with meeting both requirements, although the level of safety is not increased correspondingly. Recognizing that a common set of standards would not only economically benefit the aviation industry, but would also maintain the necessary high level of safety, the FAA and JAA consider harmonization to be a high priority.

In 1988, the FAA, in cooperation with the JAA and other organizations representing the American and European aerospace industries, began a process to harmonize the airworthiness requirements of the United States and the airworthiness requirements of Europe, especially in the areas of Flight Test and Structures.

#### **The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee**

The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) was formally established by the FAA on January 22, 1991 (56 FR 2190) to provide advice and recommendations concerning the full range of the FAA's safety-related rulemaking activity. This advice was sought to develop better rules in less overall time using fewer FAA resources than are currently needed. The committee provides the opportunity for the FAA to obtain

firsthand information and insight from interested parties regarding proposed new rules or revisions of existing rules.

There are 64 member organizations on the committee, representing a wide range of interests within the aviation community. Meetings of the committee are open to the public, except as authorized by section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

The ARAC establishes working groups to develop proposals to recommend to the FAA for resolving specific issues. Tasks assigned to working groups are published in the Federal Register. Although working group meetings are not generally open to the public, all interested parties are invited to participate as working group members. Working groups report directly to the ARAC, and the ARAC must accept a working group proposal before that proposal can be presented to the FAA as an advisory committee recommendation.

The activities of the ARAC will not, however, circumvent the public rulemaking procedures. After an ARAC recommendation is received and found acceptable by the FAA, the agency proceeds with the normal public rulemaking procedures. Any ARAC participation in a rulemaking package will be fully disclosed in the public docket.

Starting in 1992, the FAA harmonization effort for various systems related airworthiness requirements was undertaken by the ARAC. A working group of industry and government braking systems specialists of Europe, the United States, and Canada was chartered by notice in the Federal Register (59 FR 30080, June 10, 1994). The working group was tasked to develop a harmonized standard, such as a Technical Standard Order (TSO), for approval of wheels and brakes to be installed on transport category airplanes and to develop a draft notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), with supporting economic and other required analyses, and/or any other related guidance material or collateral documents, such as advisory circulars, concerning new or revised

requirements and the associated test conditions for wheels, brakes and braking systems, installed in transport category airplanes (§§ 25.731 and 25.735). The JAA is to develop a similar proposal to amend JAR-25, as necessary, to achieve harmonization.

The rulemaking proposal contained in this notice is based on a recommendation developed by the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group, and presented to the FAA by the ARAC as a recommendation.

### **Discussion of the Proposals**

The FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR §§ 25.731 and 25.735 to harmonize these sections with JAR-25. The JAA intends to publish a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA), also developed by the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group, to revise JAR-25 as necessary to ensure harmonization in those areas for which the proposed amendments differ from the current JAR-25, Change 14. When published, the NPA will be placed in the docket for this rulemaking.

Generally, the FAA proposes to: (1) add appropriate existing JAR requirements to achieve harmonization; (2) move some of the existing regulatory text, considered to be of an advisory nature, to an advisory circular; (3) add regulations addressing automatic brake systems, brake wear indicators, pressure release devices, and system compatibility; and (4) consolidate and/or separate requirement subparagraphs for clarity.

A new proposed Advisory Circular (AC) 25.735-1X, Brakes and Braking Systems Certification Tests and Analysis, has been developed by the ARAC Harmonization Working Group to ensure consistent application of these proposed revised standards. Public comments concerning AC 25.735-1X are invited by separate notice published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. The JAA intends to publish an Advisory Material Joint (AMJ), also developed by the Harmonization Working Group, to accompany their NPA. The proposed AC and the proposed AMJ contain harmonized advisory information.

A new proposed TSO-C135 has also been developed by the Harmonization Working Group as a harmonized standard for approval of transport airplane wheels and wheel and brake assemblies to replace applicable parts of the existing TSO-C26c, Aircraft Wheels and Wheel-Brakes Assemblies, dated May 18, 1984. Public comments concerning TSO-C135 are invited by separate notice published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. The JAA intends to adopt TSO-C135 as Joint Technical Standard Order (JTSO)-C135 and publish it to accompany their NPA.

#### **Discussion of Proposals in this NPRM**

**Proposal 1.** The FAA proposes to revise the current heading of § 25.735, "Brakes," to read, "§ 25.735 Brakes and braking systems."

**Discussion:** This section covers not only the brakes and their performance requirements and safety considerations, but also provides requirements for the systems and equipment associated with the brakes. As examples, the proposed additional paragraph (b)(2) refers to the brake hydraulic system and the hydraulic fluid supplying the brakes, and the proposed paragraph (e) refers to the antiskid system. The proposed change is of an editorial nature only, and consequently would have no impact on the current level of safety.

**Proposal 2.** The FAA proposes to add a heading to and revise the text of § 25.735(a) to read, "(a) Approval. Each assembly consisting of a wheel(s) and brake(s) must be approved."

**Discussion.** The current § 25.735(a), which states that each brake must be approved, is considered incomplete. Although a wheel not associated with a brake (non-braked) may be approved on its own per the applicable TSO, a brake approval is always considered in combination with its associated wheel(s) (i.e., for a combined wheel(s) and brake(s) assembly). The proposed change is of an editorial nature only and therefore would have

no impact on the current level of safety. Applicable advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

**Proposal 3.** The FAA proposes to add the heading "Brake system capability" to § 25.735(b), to separate and revise the current text of the first sentence of § 25.735(b) into §§ 25.735(b) and (b)(1), and to delete the current text of the entire second sentence to read, "(b) Brake system capability. The brake system, associated systems and components must be designed and constructed so that: (1) if any electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic or mechanical connecting or transmitting element fails, or if any single source of hydraulic or other brake operating energy supply is lost, it is possible to bring the airplane to rest with a braked roll stopping distance of not more than two times that obtained in determining the landing distance as prescribed in § 25.125."

**Discussion:** The current text of the first sentence of § 25.735(b) reads, "The brake systems and associated systems must be designed and constructed so that if any electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic, or mechanical connecting or transmitting element (excluding the operating pedal or handle) fails, or if any single source of hydraulic or other brake operating energy supply is lost, it is possible to bring the airplane to rest under conditions specified in § 25.125 with a mean deceleration during the landing roll of at least 50 percent of that obtained in determining the landing distance as prescribed in that section."

Under this proposal, the term "components" would be added to the terms "brake system and associated systems" to make it more comprehensive. The parenthetical phrase "(excluding the operating pedal or handle)" would be deleted because no justification could be found for such an exclusion. The words "braked roll stopping distance" would be inserted in place of "landing roll" to clarify that the requirement refers only to the distance covered while the brakes are applied. The change from "at least 50 percent mean deceleration" to "not more than two times the landing distance" is intended to eliminate any possible confusion between "mean" and "average" deceleration, and to



state the requirement more clearly in terms of its real intent. The other changes in text are editorial and are made for clarity.

The current second sentence reads "Subcomponents within the brake assembly, such as brake drum, shoes, and actuators (or their equivalents), shall be considered as connecting or transmitting elements, unless it is shown that leakage of hydraulic fluid resulting from failure of the sealing elements in these subcomponents within the brake assembly would not reduce the braking effectiveness below that specified in this paragraph." The current second sentence would be removed and, due to its advisory content, included as guidance material in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

The proposed changes are clarifications of current regulations and the associated terminology and therefore would have no impact on the current level of safety.

Applicable advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

**Proposal 4.** The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(b)(2) that would contain the intent and content of the ACJ 25.735(b) of JAR-25 regarding protection against fire resulting from hydraulic fluid leakage, spillage, or spraying on hot brakes. The proposal would state that, "(2) Fluid lost from a brake hydraulic system, following a failure in, or in the vicinity of, the brakes, is insufficient to cause or support a hazardous fire on the ground or in flight."

**Discussion.** Although the proposed requirement was previously included in ACJ 25.735(b) as acceptable means of compliance and interpretative material, it is now thought more appropriate that these practices should be considered as requirements as they have generally been treated as such in the past by both airplane manufacturers and regulatory authorities. The current level of safety would not be affected by this proposed change as it would adopt an existing industry practice. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 5. The FAA proposes to add the heading "Brake controls" to § 25.735(c), and to separate and revise the current text of § 25.735(c) into §§ 25.735(c) and (c)(1) to read, "(c) Brake Controls. The brake controls must be designed and constructed so that: (1) Excessive control force is not required for their operation."

Discussion: The current text reads, "Brake controls may not require excessive control force in their operation." The proposed changes are clarifications of current regulations and the associated terminology and therefore the current level of safety would not be impacted. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 6. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(c)(2) to read, "(2) If an automatic braking system is installed, means are provided to (i) arm and disarm the system, and (ii) allow the pilot(s) to override the system by use of manual braking."

Discussion. The intent and content of the proposed changes have generally been adopted in the design of current automatic braking systems and are currently included in FAA Order 8110.8, "Engineering Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes," as interpretative and acceptable means of compliance. Consequently, both the airplane manufacturers and the regulatory authorities have generally considered them as standard practices; therefore, they would not impact the current level of safety. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 7. The FAA proposes to amend § 25.735(d) by adding the heading, "Parking brake," and by modifying the current text from, "The airplane must have a parking control that, when set by the pilot, will without further attention, prevent the airplane from rolling on a paved, level runway with takeoff power on the critical engine," to "(d)

Parking brake. The airplane must have a parking brake control that, when selected on, will, without further attention, prevent the airplane from rolling on a dry and level paved runway when the most adverse combination of maximum thrust on one engine and up to maximum ground idle thrust on any, or all, other engine(s) is applied. The control must

be suitably located or be adequately protected to prevent inadvertent operation. There must be indication in the cockpit when the parking brake is not fully released.”

**Discussion:** Introduction of the word "brake" before "control" clarifies that the paragraph refers to the means provided to the flightcrew for the application of the wheel brakes in the airplane parking mode. By revising the text, as proposed, the requirement would be enhanced to cover not only the case of a single engine takeoff thrust check with all other engines stopped, but would also cover an equally if not more probable case where any or all other engines are operating and producing up to a maximum ground idle thrust. The proposal also clarifies the extent of the takeoff thrust to be considered for the "critical" engine as the maximum that can be achieved, and by implication also requires the relevant thrust cases for remaining engine(s) according to the environmental circumstances that are dictated for the achievement of the maximum takeoff thrust on the critical engine. The word "dry" is added solely for clarification of the current understanding of this requirement.

The requirement for suitable location or protection against inadvertent operation of the parking brake control is derived from the current ACJ 25.735(d) of JAR-25 and is introduced because it is believed that such considerations should be regarded as requirements, and have generally been treated as such in the past by both airplane manufacturers and regulatory authorities. The additional requirement for cockpit indication when the parking brake is "not fully released" is to caution the pilot against a takeoff with the parking brake set. The proposed changes potentially enhance the current level of safety by clarifying intent and addressing some critical cases. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

**Proposal 8.** The FAA proposes to add the heading "Antiskid system" to § 25.735(e), to delete the current text “no single probable malfunction will result in a hazardous loss of

braking ability or directional control of the airplane” as being superfluous, and in order to facilitate the introduction of the new proposed §§ 25.735(e)(1) and (e)(2) under proposals 9 and 10 respectively, revise the remaining current text to read,

"(e) Antiskid system. If an antiskid system is installed:"

Discussion: The current § 25.735(e) reads: "If antiskid devices are installed, the devices and associated systems must be designed so that no single probable malfunction will result in a hazardous loss of braking ability or directional control of the airplane." The reference to antiskid devices and associated systems would be changed to "antiskid system," this being more appropriate to the paragraph's intent. The term "probable" was incompatible with the terminology of § 25.1309 because a "probable" malfunction cannot be associated with either major or hazardous effects and, if used in the "§ 25.1309" sense, could lead to a requirement that could be seen as less severe than § 25.1309 for that specific failure condition, with no obvious technical/state of the art reasons. It appears that the terminology (probable and hazardous) used was probably not "§ 25.1309 related" when the requirement was first introduced. Rather than trying to define the words, it is considered that the requirement is adequately covered by § 25.1309 and the current § 25.735(e) is superfluous. The proposed changes are of a clarifying and an editorial nature only and therefore would have no impact on the current level of safety.

Appropriate advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 9. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(e)(1) to read, "(1) It must operate satisfactorily over the range of expected runway conditions, without external adjustment".

Discussion: The intent and content of the proposed changes are currently included in FAA Order 8110.8, "Engineering Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes," as interpretative material and acceptable means of compliance and are deemed appropriate to be adopted as requirements. Both the airplane manufacturers and the regulatory authorities have, in the past, considered them as standard practices; therefore,

they would not impact the current level of safety. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 10. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(e)( 2) to read, "(2) It must, at all times, have priority over the automatic braking system, if installed."

Discussion: The intent and content of the proposed change is currently included in FAA Order 8110.8, "Engineering Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes," as interpretative material and acceptable means of compliance and is deemed appropriate to be adopted as a requirement. Both the airplane manufacturers and the regulatory authorities have, in the past, considered it as a standard practice; therefore, it would not impact the current level of safety. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 11. **(Note: This item proposes changes to amendments proposed in NPRM 93-8, Improved Standards for Determining Rejected Takeoff and Landing Performance. Publication of that amendment is expected soon. In the event that this rulemaking should proceed to publication before the RTO amendment, this proposal will be rewritten to address the current FAR/JAR.)**

The FAA proposes to amend § 25.735(f) by adding the heading "Kinetic energy capacity," by consolidating the requirements of current paragraphs (f) and (h), by adding similar requirements for a high energy landing condition, by removing paragraphs (f)(1) and (2), and paragraphs (h)(1), and (2), and by revising the text to read:

**"(f) Kinetic energy capacity.** The design landing stop, the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop, and the most severe landing stop brake kinetic energy absorption requirements of each wheel and brake assembly must be determined. It must be substantiated by dynamometer testing that, at the declared fully worn limit(s) of the brake heat sink, the wheel and brake assemblies are capable of absorbing not less than these

levels of kinetic energy. Energy absorption rates defined by the airplane manufacturer must be achieved. These rates must be equivalent to mean decelerations not less than 10  $\text{fps}^2$  for the design landing stop and 6  $\text{fps}^2$  for the maximum kinetic energy accelerate stop. The most severe landing stop need not be considered for extremely improbable failure conditions or if the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop energy is more severe. Design landing stop is an operational landing stop at maximum landing weight. Maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop is a rejected takeoff for the most critical combination of airplane takeoff weight and speed. Most severe landing stop is a stop at the most critical combination of airplane landing weight and speed.

Discussion: The current paragraphs (f) and (h) state that the brake kinetic energy capacity ratings may not be less than the determined energy absorption requirements. The proposed paragraph (f) would require the calculation of the necessary energy absorption capacity, and require dynamometer test substantiation of the capability of the wheel and brake assemblies to absorb the energy at not less than specified rates. Usually, brakes are sized to exceed the calculated energy absorption requirements (i.e., their capacity exceeds the requirements, hence the heading "Kinetic energy capacity"). The term "rating" would be deleted because it is more relevant to the TSO than to the regulation. The proposed change would encompass the requirements of current paragraph (h) without the need for complete duplication of text.

The term "rejected takeoff" used under current paragraph (h) would be replaced with "accelerate-stop" for compatibility with § 25.109 terminology; and the term "most severe landing stop" would be added to address cases such as emergency return to land after takeoff, where the brake energy for a flaps up landing may exceed that corresponding to the accelerate-stop energy. For the accelerate-stop and the most severe landing stop, it is intended that the initial brake temperature resulting from previous brake use must be accounted for as specified in paragraphs 3.3.3.3 and 3.3.4.3 in the proposed

TSO-C135. It should be noted that the consideration for the initial temperature (in terms of residual energy) reflects an existing British Civil Aviation authority (CAA) Specification 17 requirement. Changing the term "main wheel-brake assemblies" to "wheel and brake assemblies," ensures the paragraph's applicability to any wheels fitted with brakes (i.e., includes the possibility of nose wheel brakes, etc.) and further ensures the understanding that the absorption requirements apply to the wheel and brake assembly. The substantiation statement requires that the wheel and brake assemblies be capable of absorbing the calculated levels of kinetic energy at the fully worn limit and that the energy absorption capability substantiation testing be conducted on the dynamometer.

The current §§ 25.735(f)(1) and (h)(1) would be incorporated in proposed AC 25.735-1X, because their content is not strictly part of the requirement, but provides advice on the primary features that should be conservatively included in a rational analysis.

The current §§ 25.735(f)(2) and (h)(2) are not strictly the requirement, but advice on the method of energy calculation to be used. Consequently, these would be incorporated in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Because the required energy capacity of each wheel and brake assembly must be determined, the need to refer to "designed unequal braking distributions" is no longer necessary and would be deleted.

The current level of safety would be retained and possibly enhanced by addressing the most severe landing stop condition. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 12. The FAA proposes to remove the current § 25.735(g) requirement.

Discussion: The current § 25.735(g) requirement states that when setting up the dynamometer test inertia, an increase in the initial brake application speed is not a permissible method of accounting for a reduced (i.e., lower than ideal) dynamometer mass. This method is not permissible because, for a target test deceleration, a reduction in the energy absorption rate would result, and could produce a performance different from that which would be achieved with the correct brake application speed. Such a situation is recognized and is similarly stated in the proposed new TSO-C135, which would provide an acceptable means for wheel and brake assembly approval under § 25.735(a), thus making current § 25.735(g) unnecessary. The proposed change consolidates existing requirements and deletes redundant wording, and therefore would not impact the current level of safety.

Proposal 13. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(g), "Brake condition after high kinetic energy dynamometer stop(s)," to read, "Following the high kinetic energy stop demonstration(s) required by paragraph (f) of this section, with the parking brake promptly and fully applied for at least three (3) minutes, it must be demonstrated that for at least five (5) minutes from application of the parking brake, no condition occurs (or has occurred during the stop), including fire associated with the tire or wheel and brake assembly, that could prejudice the safe and complete evacuation of the airplane."

Discussion: Paragraph (g) would require that the parking brake be applied for a minimum of three minutes, which is considered to be the minimum period of time required to cover the brake's ability to maintain the airplane in a stationary condition to allow a safe evacuation.

The requirement also gives consideration to the fact that the flightcrew may not be aware of the condition of the brake assemblies at the commencement of the flight, nor of the condition of the brake and wheel assemblies following the braking maneuver.

Furthermore, the reason for the severe braking could encompass both airplane system and



engine failures or fires. It would therefore appear sensible that it should be demonstrated that neither during the stop, nor for a reasonable period of time after its completion, no condition(s) shall occur as a result of these maneuvers that could further prejudice the safe and complete evacuation of the airplane. On the basis that an evacuation may be determined as prudent or necessary, and that such an evacuation must be capable of completion, irrespective of the timely response of the emergency services, five minutes would appear to be a reasonable period of time for the associated brake systems and equipment to remain free from conditions that might prejudice or jeopardize the evacuation. It is proposed that this period should commence at the time of initial application of the parking brake, this being a time during which the possible need for evacuation and airport emergency services occurs following an accelerate-stop. The proposed changes provide for the additional demonstration of a safe condition following high energy absorption by the wheels and brakes, which was not previously required. Although previously approved brakes may have been able to comply with the requirement, approval could not have been refused had this not been the case. It is therefore believed that the proposed changes would provide a potential enhancement of the current level of safety. Applicable advisory material would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 14. The FAA proposes to add a modified version of the current JAR 25.735 (i) as new 14 CFR § 25.735(h), "Stored energy systems," to read as follows:

“(h) Stored energy systems. An indication to the flightcrew of usable stored energy must be provided if a stored energy system is used to show compliance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section. The available stored energy must be sufficient for:

(1) At least six (6) full applications of the brakes when an antiskid system is not operating; and,

(2) Bringing the airplane to a complete stop when an antiskid system is operating, under all runway surface conditions for which the airplane is certificated.”

Discussion: A full brake application is defined as an application from brakes fully released to brakes fully applied, and back to fully released. For those airplanes that may provide a number of independent braking systems, which are not "reliant" on a stored energy system for the demonstration of compliance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section, but which perhaps incorporate a stored energy device, this requirement is not applicable. It would be unreasonable that the requirement for a minimum energy capacity and the provision of means to indicate the level of stored energy to the flightcrew should be maintained, particularly if its failure would have a minimal consequence on airplane or passenger safety.

In the event that an hydraulic accumulator is used for energy storage and the gas pressurization depletes, a pressure indication alone as currently required in JAR 25.735(i) would be inadequate because it would not provide indication of such faults to the flightcrew. In fact, the current typical flight deck presentation could give a false sense of security to the crew because it would almost inevitably indicate a satisfactory pressure, regardless of the real situation. Consequently, the proposed rule would require a measure of the stored energy, rather than pressure, to be presented to the flightcrew.

The minimum level of stored energy required for the emergency/standby braking means would be presented as a requirement rather than as advisory material. In the majority of cases, this material has been used as a virtual requirement in the past by airplane manufacturers and regulatory authorities. The proposed change would potentially enhance the current level of safety because the FAA is proposing to adopt a common but not universal industry practice and an improvement over the existing JAR rule. Applicable advisory material would be included in the proposed new AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 15. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(i), "Brake wear indicators," to read as follows:

"(i) Brake wear indicators. Means must be provided for each brake assembly to indicate when the heat sink is worn to the permissible limit. The means must be reliable and readily visible."

Discussion: In order to ensure, as far as is practicable, that the brake heat sink is not worn beyond its allowable wear limits throughout its operational life, it is considered necessary to provide some device that can readily identify the fully worn limit of the heat sink. The proposal reflects a requirement included in a series of airworthiness directives issued between 1989 and 1994 to require establishment of brake wear limits and to provide means to indicate the same. The British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Specification No. 17 also specifies the provision of such an indicator, and the majority of wheel and brake assembly designs include such a device. The proposed rule would have no impact on the current level of safety, because the FAA is proposing to adopt an existing industry practice. Appropriate advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Proposal 16. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(j), "Overtemperature burst prevention," a new § 25.731(d), "Overpressure burst prevention," and a new § 25.731(e), "Braked wheels," to read as follows:

"§ 25.735(j) Overtemperature burst prevention. Means must be provided in each braked wheel to prevent wheel failure and tire burst that may result from elevated brake temperatures. Additionally, all wheels must meet the requirements of § 25.731(d)."

"§ 25.731(d) Overpressure burst prevention. Means must be provided in each wheel to prevent wheel failure and tire burst that may result from excessive pressurization of the wheel and tire assembly."

“§ 25.731(e) Braked wheels. Each braked wheel must meet the applicable requirements of § 25.735.”

Discussion - § 25.735(j): There is an existing requirement (§ 25.729(f)) related to the protection of equipment in wheel wells against the effects of bursting tires and a similar requirement is stated in TSO-C26c, Wheels and Wheel-Brake Assemblies. JAR 25.729(f) requires protection of equipment on the landing gear and in wheel wells against tire burst and elevated brake temperatures, and a similar requirement is stated in the “Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Wheels and Brakes on JAR Part 25 Civil Aeroplanes” (document ED-69). However, there is no direct requirement in either part 25 or JAR-25 that means must be provided to prevent wheel failure and tire burst that could result from elevated brake temperatures. As a result, it has become an industry practice to incorporate pressure release device(s) that function as a result of elevated wheel temperatures to deflate the tires. Nevertheless, it is believed to be both reasonable and prudent that such a requirement should be clearly stated in the paragraph related to airplane brakes and braking systems. The proposed requirement for temperature activated devices would not impact the current level of safety. Applicable advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Discussion - § 25.731(d): Wheel failure and tire burst due to overinflation presents a hazard to ground personnel and the airplane. Certain airplane manufacturers require wheel pressure release devices that reduce this hazard. This is considered a safety issue requiring the incorporation of these devices. Incorporation of pressure release devices in tire inflation equipment is not considered adequate due to a history of misuse resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. Installation in the wheel reduces the potential for tampering or misuse and insures proper levels of protection. The proposed change would retain and potentially enhance the current level of safety. Applicable advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

Discussion - § 25.731(e): § 25.731 contains regulations applicable to all airplane wheels. If the wheel is braked, additional regulations apply which are contained in § 25.735. Section 25.731(e) is added to provide a cross-reference to those additional requirements. The proposed change would retain and potentially enhance the current level of safety.

Proposal 17. The FAA proposes to add a new § 25.735(k), "Compatibility," to read as follows:

“(k) Compatibility. Compatibility of the wheel and brake assemblies with the airplane and its systems must be substantiated.”

Discussion: Reliable and consistent brake system performance can be adversely affected by incompatibilities within the system and with the landing gear and the airplane. As part of the overall substantiation of safe and anomaly free operation, it is necessary to show that no unsafe conditions arise from incompatibilities between the brakes and brake system with other airplane systems and structures. Areas such as antiskid tuning, landing gear dynamics, tire type and size, brake combinations, brake characteristics, brake and landing gear vibrations, etc., need to be explored and corrected if necessary. Therefore, this requirement is introduced to address these issues which are normally covered by airplane manufacturers during development of the airplane and must be addressed by modifiers of the equipment. Incorporation of this requirement would potentially enhance the current level of safety. Appropriate advisory information would be included in proposed AC 25.735-1X.

**Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, and Trade Impact Assessment**

Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Finally, the Office of Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effects of regulatory changes on international trade. In conducting these assessments, the FAA has determined that this proposed rule: (1) would generate benefits exceeding its costs and is not "significant" as defined in Executive Order 12866; (2) is not "significant" as defined in DOT's Policies and Procedures; (3) would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities; and (4) would lessen restraints on international trade. These analyses, available in the docket, are summarized below.

#### Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Although numerous revisions would be made to FAR § 25.735, only one would impose additional quantified costs for both part 25 large and small airplane manufacturers (see proposal 11). One ARAC member, a manufacturer of part 25 small airplanes, asserted that proposals 7, 14, and 16 would also impose incremental costs, but provided no specific estimates. Essentially all of the changes codify current industry practice or conform FAR § 25.735 to corresponding sections of the JAR. Adoption of the proposed changes would increase harmonization and commonality between American and European airworthiness standards. Harmonization would eliminate unnecessary duplication of airworthiness requirements, thus reducing manufacturers' certification costs (6 substantive proposals out of 17 total in the subject NPRM would essentially mirror the proposed European standards; the 11 others would not differ significantly). The FAA believes the harmonization cost savings would exceed the relatively low incremental costs of the proposed rule (see Summary of Costs and Benefits section below).

Proposal 7. Changes regarding parking brake control and cockpit indication of the brake essentially reflect current industry practice for the majority of part 25

manufacturers; consequently, there are no expected incremental costs. As noted above, one manufacturer of part 25 small airplanes, however, indicated that its current designs do not meet this requirement and that costs for cockpit indication in future designs would, in fact, be incremental. The manufacturer, however, did not provide such costs to the FAA. The FAA invites that manufacturer (and/or other interested parties) to provide detailed cost estimates during the public comment period.

Proposal 11. One ARAC member, a manufacturer of part 25 large airplanes, notes that the average impact of the 10% residual RTO energy requirement would be a two to three percent increase in the brake's energy absorption requirements. Notwithstanding, this increase is smaller than the tolerances on its ability to define brake requirements and the brake manufacturer's conformance to the specifications. Also, higher residual energies would enable the manufacturer to raise its recommended brake temperatures for dispatch, so any potential higher brake costs would be offset by more efficient aircraft operation (shorter turnaround times, less time at gate waiting for brakes to cool).

The term "most severe landing stop" ("MSL") would be added to address cases such as immediate return to land after takeoff, where the brake energy for a flaps up landing may exceed that corresponding to the accelerate-stop energy. The MSL requirement, while a new FAA requirement, has been in effect in Europe (per British CAA); consequently, many large part 25 airplane manufacturers currently meet this standard. Notwithstanding, large part 25 airframe and brake manufacturers note that in almost all cases either the MSL stop energy would not exceed the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop energy or, the MSL stop condition is extremely improbable. One part 25 large airplane manufacturer, however, noted that demonstrating adherence to this requirement for its typical airplane model would add the equivalent of two additional

high energy dynamometer tests in which the test brake would be destroyed; estimated incremental one-time costs for this equal approximately \$60,000 per type certification. Another manufacturer, however, estimates only one test in the \$20,000 - \$40,000 range. Manufacturers of small part 25 airplanes would experience some incremental one-time testing costs totalling approximately \$20,000 per type certification.

The aforementioned nonrecurring costs for either the part 25 large or small airplane type certification would easily be offset by the harmonization cost savings cited earlier. Any potential safety benefits from avoiding even one minor accident would add to such benefits. The FAA, therefore, finds proposal 11 to be cost beneficial.

Proposal 14. As the stored energy requirement reflects current industry practice for most part 25 manufacturers, there would be no expected incremental costs associated with it. However, the same manufacturer (of part 25 small airplanes) that reported potential costs for proposal 7 also indicated that its current designs do not include usable stored energy indication, and compliance with this requirement in future designs would impose incremental costs; detailed cost estimates, however, were not provided. The FAA requests that the manufacturer (or others) provide detailed cost estimates during the public comment period.

Proposal 16. In the last several years, many wheel manufacturers have included pressure release devices in most new production wheels in order to avoid potential liability. Codification of existing industry practice would ensure that the enhanced level of safety is retained. There are no expected incremental costs associated with this proposal since it does reflect current industry practice. However, the same manufacturer (of part 25 small airplanes) that, in contrast to other manufacturers, reported potential costs for proposals 7 and 14 indicated that the requirement for wheel pressure release devices would also impose incremental costs in future designs. Again, the FAA invites



that manufacturer (or others) to provide detailed cost estimates during the public comment period.

#### Summary of Costs and Benefits

As delineated above, and barring more detailed information for proposals 7, 14, and 16, the FAA concludes that only proposal 11 would result in incremental costs attributable to the subject NPRM. Demonstrating adherence to the MSL requirement would increase nonrecurring testing costs from \$20,000 - \$60,000 for a part 25 large airplane type certification; the amount for a part 25 small airplane type certification is estimated to be \$20,000. According to one manufacturer, cost savings from harmonization, in terms of avoiding added costs of coordination and documentation, with the JAA and involving, for example, additional travel overseas, reports, etc., would be equal to or greater than the maximum incremental cost of \$60,000. The FAA believes that potential safety benefits resulting from specification of minimum accepted standards would supplement these cost-savings. Although there were numerous (approx. 170) accidents involving brake failures during landings in the period 1982-1995, none were determined to have been directly preventable by the subject provisions. Different designs in future type certifications, however, could present unexpected problems and raise future accident rates. This proposed rule is expected to reduce the chances of future accidents by codifying in the FAR (and therefore making mandatory) what was prevailing, but not necessarily universal, industry practice.

For the reasons specified, the FAA finds the proposed rule to be cost-beneficial.

#### Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily and disproportionately burdened by government regulations. The RFA requires a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis if a proposed or final

rule would have a significant economic impact, either detrimental or beneficial, on a substantial number of small entities. FAA Order 2100.14A, Regulatory Flexibility Criteria and Guidance, prescribes standards for complying with RFA review requirements in FAA rulemaking actions. The Order defines "small entities" in terms of size thresholds, "significant economic impact" in terms of annualized cost threshold, and "substantial number" as a number that is not less than eleven and that is more than one-third of the small entities subject to the proposed or final rule.

The proposed rule would affect manufacturers of transport category airplanes produced under future new airplane type certifications. For manufacturers, Order 2100.14A specifies a size threshold for classification as a small entity as 75 or fewer employees. Since no part 25 airplane manufacturer has 75 or fewer employees, the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small manufacturers.

#### *International Trade Impact Assessment*

Consistent with the Administration's belief in the general superiority, desirability, and efficacy of free trade, it is the policy of the Administrator to remove or diminish, to the extent feasible, barriers to international trade, including both barriers affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign countries and those affecting the import of foreign goods and services into the United States.

In accordance with that policy, the FAA is committed to develop as much as possible its aviation standards and practices in harmony with its trading partners. Significant cost savings can result from this, both to United States companies doing business in foreign markets, and foreign companies doing business in the United States.

This proposed rule is a direct action to respond to this policy by increasing the harmonization of the U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations with the European Joint Aviation

Requirements. The result would be a positive step toward removing impediments to international trade.

### **Federalism Implications**

The amended regulations proposed in this rulemaking would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant preparing a Federalism Assessment.

### **International Compatibility**

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has determined that this proposed rule would not conflict with any international agreement of the United States.

### **Paperwork Reduction Act**

There are no new requirements for information collection associated with this proposed rule that would require approval from the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)).

### **Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska.**

Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in Title 14 of the CFR in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to establish such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers appropriate. Because this proposed rule would apply

to the certification of future designs of transport category airplanes and their subsequent operation, it could, if adopted, affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on whether there is justification for applying the proposed rule differently to intrastate operations in Alaska.

## **INFORMATION CONTACT.**

### **List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25**

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements

### **The Proposed Amendments**

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) as follows:

## **PART 25 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES**

1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

2. Section 25.731 would be amended by adding new paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as follows:

### **§ 25.731 Wheels**

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(d) Overpressure burst prevention. Means must be provided in each wheel to prevent wheel failure and tire burst that may result from excessive pressurization of the wheel and tire assembly.

(e) Braked Wheels. Each braked wheel must meet the applicable requirements of § 25.735.

3. Section 25.735 would be revised to read as follows:

### **§ 25.735 Brakes and braking systems**

(a) Approval. Each assembly consisting of a wheel(s) and brake(s) must be approved.

(b) Brake system capability. The brake system, associated systems and components must be designed and constructed so that:

(1) If any electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic, or mechanical connecting or transmitting element fails, or if any single source of hydraulic or other brake operating energy supply is lost, it is possible to bring the airplane to rest with a braked roll stopping distance of not more than two times that obtained in determining the landing distance as prescribed in § 25.125.

(2) Fluid lost from a brake hydraulic system, following a failure in, or in the vicinity of, the brakes, is insufficient to cause or support a hazardous fire on the ground or in flight.

(c) Brake controls. The brake controls must be designed and constructed so that:

(1) Excessive control force is not required for their operation.

(2) If an automatic braking system is installed, means are provided to:

(i) arm and disarm the system, and

(ii) allow the pilot(s) to override the system by use of manual braking.

(d) Parking brake. The airplane must have a parking brake control that, when selected on, will, without further attention, prevent the airplane from rolling on a dry and level paved runway when the most adverse combination of maximum thrust on one engine and up to maximum ground idle thrust on any, or all, other engine(s) is applied. The control must be suitably located or be adequately protected to prevent inadvertent operation. There must be indication in the cockpit when the parking brake is not fully released.

(e) Antiskid system. If an antiskid system is installed:

(1) It must operate satisfactorily over the range of expected runway conditions, without external adjustment.

(2) It must, at all times, have priority over the automatic braking system, if installed.

(f) Kinetic energy capacity. The design landing stop, the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop, and the most severe landing stop brake kinetic energy absorption requirements of each wheel and brake assembly must be determined. It must be substantiated by dynamometer testing that, at the declared fully worn limit(s) of the brake heat sink, the wheel and brake assemblies are capable of absorbing not less than these levels of kinetic energy. Energy absorption rates defined by the airplane manufacturer must be achieved. These rates must be equivalent to mean decelerations not less than 10  $\text{fps}^2$  for the design landing stop and 6  $\text{fps}^2$  for the maximum kinetic energy accelerate stop. The most severe landing stop need not be considered for extremely improbable failure conditions or if the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop energy is more severe. Design landing stop is an operational landing stop at maximum landing weight. Maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop is a rejected takeoff for the most critical combination of airplane takeoff weight and speed. Most severe landing stop is a stop at the most critical combination of airplane landing weight and speed.

(g) Brake condition after high kinetic energy dynamometer stop(s). Following the high kinetic energy stop demonstration(s) required by paragraph (f) of this section, with the parking brake promptly and fully applied for at least three (3) minutes, it must be demonstrated that for at least five (5) minutes from application of the parking brake, no condition occurs (or has occurred during the stop), including fire associated with the tire or wheel and brake assembly, that could prejudice the safe and complete evacuation of the airplane.

(h) Stored energy systems. An indication to the flightcrew of the usable stored energy must be provided if a stored energy system is used to show compliance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section. The available stored energy must be sufficient for:

(1) At least six (6) full applications of the brakes when an antiskid system is not operating; and

(2) Bringing the airplane to a complete stop when an antiskid system is operating, under all runway surface conditions for which the airplane is certificated.

(i) Brake wear indicators. Means must be provided for each brake assembly to indicate when the heat sink is worn to the permissible limit. The means must be reliable and readily visible.

(j) Overtemperature burst prevention. Means must be provided in each braked wheel to prevent wheel failure and tire burst that may result from elevated brake temperatures. Additionally, all wheels must meet the requirements of § 25.731(d).

(k) Compatibility. Compatibility of the wheel and brake assemblies with the airplane and its systems must be substantiated.

Issued in Washington, DC, on

BRAKES AND BRAKING SYSTEMS CERTIFICATION  
TESTS, AND ANALYSIS ANM-110

1. **PURPOSE.** This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance material for use as an acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the braking system requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) for transport category airplanes. Like all AC material, this AC is not, in itself, mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. It is issued to provide an acceptable means, although not the only means, of compliance with the rules. Terms used in this AC, such as "shall" and "must," are used only in the sense of ensuring applicability of this particular method of compliance when the acceptable method of compliance described herein is used. While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience in determining compliance with the pertinent FAR. This advisory circular does not change, create any additional, authorize changes in, or permit deviations from, regulatory requirements.

2. **RELATED DOCUMENTS**

a. **Related Federal Aviation Regulations.** Sections 25.731 and 25.735 of the FAR, as amended through Amendment 25-xx, and other sections relating to brakes and braking system installations. Sections which prescribe requirements for the design, substantiation, and certification of braking systems include:

§ 21.303	Replacement and modification parts
§ 25.101	General
§ 25.109	Accelerate-stop distance
§ 25.125	Landing
§ 25.301	Loads
§ 25.303	Factor of safety
§ 25.729	Retracting mechanism
§ 25.733	Tires
§ 25.1301	Function and installation.
§ 25.1309	Equipment, systems and installations.
§ 25.1322	Warning, caution and advisory lights.
§ 25.1501	General: Systems and equipment limitations (JAR25x1524)
§ 25.1541	Markings and Placards

Additional sections (and their associated advisory circulars where applicable) that prescribe requirements which can have a significant impact on the overall design and configuration of braking systems include, but are not limited to:



§ 21.101	Designation of applicable regulations
§ 25.863	Flammable fluid fire protection
§ 25.943	Negative acceleration (JAR 25x1315)
§ 25.1001	Fuel jettisoning system
§ 25.1183	Flammable fluid-carrying components
§ 25.1185	Flammable fluids

b. Advisory Circulars (AC's).

AC 25.1309-1A	System Design and Analysis
AC 25-7	Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes (under revision)
AC 21-29A	Detecting and Reporting Suspected Unapproved Parts
AC 91-6A	Water, Slush, and Snow on the Runway (AMJ 25x1591 Supplementary Performance Information for Takeoff from Wet Runways and for Operation on Runways Contaminated by Standing Water, Slush, Loose Snow, Compacted Snow, or Ice)

c. Technical Standard Orders (TSO's).

TSO-C26c	Aircraft Wheels and Wheel-Brake Assemblies with Addendum I
TSO-C135	Transport Airplane Wheel and Wheel and Brake Assemblies
TSO-C62d	Tires
TSO-C75	Hydraulic Hose Assemblies

d. Federal Aviation Administration Orders.

Order 8110.4A	Type Certification Process
Order 8110.8	Engineering Flight Test Guide For Transport Category Airplanes

Advisory Circulars, TSOs, and FAA Orders can be obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, SVC-121.23, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785.

e. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Documents.

ARP 597C	Wheels and Brakes, Supplementary Criteria for Design Endurance - Civil Transport Aircraft
ARP 813A	Maintainability Recommendations for Aircraft Wheels and Brakes
AIR 1064B	Brake Dynamics
ARP 1070B	Design and Testing of Antiskid Brake Control Systems for Total Aircraft Compatibility
AS 1145A	Aircraft Brake Temperature Monitor System (BTMS)
ARP 1619	Replacement and Modified Brakes and Wheels
AIR 1739	Information on Antiskid Systems
ARP 1907	Automatic Braking System Requirements
AIR 1934	Use of Carbon Heat Sink Brakes on Aircraft
ARP 4102/2	Automatic Braking System (ABS)
ISO 7137	Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment (not an SAE document but is available from the SAE)

These documents can be obtained from the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 15096.

f. RTCA Documents.

RTCA/DO-160D	Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne equipment, Issued July 12, 1996.
RTCA/DO-178B	Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Issued December 1, 1992

Copies of RTCA documents may be purchased from the RTCA Inc., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1020, Washington, D.C. 20036.

g. Military Documents.

MIL-STD-810	Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines
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This document can be obtained from the Department of Defense, DODSSP, Standardization Document Order Desk, 700 Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094.

3. BACKGROUND.

a. Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to the FAR to replace Part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). For wheels, CAR 4b.335(a) and (b), respectively, became §§ 25.731(a) and (b) of the FAR. For brakes/braking systems, CAR 4b.337 (a)(1), 4b.337(a)(2) and (a)(3), 4b.337(b), 4b.337(c), 4b.337(d), 4b.335(c), and 4b.335(d), respectively, became §§ 25.735(a), 735(b), 735(c), 735(d), 735(e), 735(f), and 735(g) of the FAR. Since then, § 25.735 has been revised by Amendment 25-23 (1970), Amendment 25-48 (1979), Amendment 25-52 (1980), Amendment 25-72 (1990), Amendment 25-XX [insert amendment number when final rule resulting from Notice 93-8 is published], Improved Standards for Determining Rejected Takeoff and Landing Performance, and Amendment 25-XX [insert amendment number when published], Revision of Braking Systems Airworthiness Standards to Harmonize with European Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes, to make the regulations more comprehensive and to delete redundancies.

(1) Amendment 25-23 deleted reference to military specification (MIL-B-8075) to show compliance for antiskid devices under § 25.735(e), to allow any other acceptable means of compliance. In addition, proper units of "knots" were added to stall speed under § 25.735(f)(2).

(2) Amendment 25-48 revised the technical standard order TSO-C26b for aircraft wheels and wheel-brake assemblies and related type certification requirements for airplane brakes (§ 25.735). The revised standard TSO-C26c incorporated updated and improved minimum performance standards for the design and construction of aircraft wheels and brakes. The amendment also changed § 25.735 as follows: Under § 25.735(b), the incorrect reference to § 25.75 was replaced by a correct reference to § 25.125. Under § 25.735(f)(2), the numerical constant 0.0442 was corrected as 0.0443, and the letter "N" was appropriately redefined as the Number of main wheels with brakes. Under § 25.735(f)(2), the term  $V_{SO}$  in the formula was replaced with "V" such that V must not be less than  $V_{SO}$  under definition. Under § 25.735(g), the term  $V_{SO}$  was replaced by V to be consistent with terminology used under § 25.735(f)(2).

(3) Under Amendment 25-52, § 37.172, Aircraft wheels and brakes, TSO-C26c was removed from the regulations, previously published as Subpart B of 14 CFR part 37, and made available to the public through the FAA Office of Airworthiness, Aircraft Engineering Division, Systems Branch (AWS-130) at FAA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at all regional Flight Standards Engineering and Manufacturing Offices. Subpart A of 14 CFR part 37 was included in Subpart O of 14 CFR part 21. Part 37 was revoked.

(4) Under Amendment 25-72, the text of the last sentence in existing § 25.735(b) was changed to clarify the intent. In addition, § 25.731 was amended to become compatible with § 25.25, which had been amended to provide for weights that are in excess of takeoff weight, such as ramp weights, provided that compliance with the applicable structural requirements, including wheel strength, is demonstrated at the higher weights.

(5) Under Amendment 25-XX [insert amendment number, when published, of the rule resulting from Notice 93-8, Improved Standards for Determining Rejected Takeoff and Landing Performance], the regulations were updated to add the brake wear limits determination requirements. On May 21, 1988, an American Airlines DC-10 experienced an 86% maximum kinetic energy (KE) rejected takeoff (RTO) in a dispatch configuration in which eight of the ten brakes were worn close to the maintenance limits. The eight brakes failed in the early portion of the braking run and the airplane overran the runway. As a result, the FAA reviewed the methodology used in the determination of allowable brake wear limits for transport category airplanes. It was determined that brake wear limits should be established during certification to ensure that fully worn brakes will function properly during a maximum KE RTO. The FAA issued a series of airplane specific airworthiness directives between 1989 and 1994 to establish brake wear limits using the new criteria.

(6) Although part 25 and JAR-25 are very similar, they are not identical. Differences between the FAR and the JAR can result in substantial additional costs when airplanes are type certificated to both standards. Starting In 1992, the harmonization effort for various systems-related airworthiness requirements was undertaken by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). A working group of industry and government braking systems specialists from Europe, the United States, and Canada was chartered by notice in the Federal Register (59 FR 30080, June 10, 1994). The working group was tasked to develop harmonized standards and any collateral documents, such as advisory circulars, concerning new or revised requirements for braking systems, and the associated test conditions for braking systems, installed in transport category airplanes (§§ 25.731 and 25.735). The advisory material contained in this AC was developed by the Braking Systems Harmonization Working Group to ensure consistent application of the standards revised under Amendment 25-XX [insert amendment number when published], Revision of Braking Systems Airworthiness Standards to Harmonize with European Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes, and the corresponding new TSO-C135.

#### 4. DISCUSSION.

##### a. Approval.

(1) (Ref. § 25.735(a)). Each wheel and brake assembly fitted with each designated and approved tire type and size, where appropriate, should be shown to be capable of meeting the minimum standards and capabilities detailed in the applicable TSO, in combination with the type certification procedures for the airplane; or by any other means approved by the Administrator. This applies equally to replacement, modified, and refurbished wheel and brake assemblies or components, whether the changes are made by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or others. Additionally, the components of the wheels, brakes, and braking systems should be designed to:

(a) Withstand all pressures and loads, applied separately and in conjunction, to which they may be subjected in all operating conditions for which the airplane is certificated.

(b) Withstand simultaneous applications of normal and emergency braking functions, unless adequate design measures have been taken to prevent such a contingency..

(c) Meet the energy absorption requirements without auxiliary cooling devices (such as cooling fans)

(d) Not induce unacceptable vibrations at any likely ground speed and condition or any operating condition (such as retraction or extension).

(e) Protect against the ingress or effects of foreign bodies or materials (water, mud, oil, and other products) that may adversely affect their satisfactory performance. Combinations of any additional wheel and brake assemblies should meet the applicable airworthiness requirements specified in §§ 21.101(a) and (b) to eliminate situations that may have adverse consequences on airplane braking control and performance. This includes the possibility of the use of modified brakes either alone (i.e., as a shipset) or alongside the OEM's brakes and the mixing of separately approved assemblies.

(2) Refurbished and Overhauled Equipment. Refurbished and overhauled equipment is equipment overhauled and maintained by the applicable OEM or its designee in accordance with the OEM's Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) and associated documents. It is necessary to demonstrate compliance of all refurbished configurations with the applicable TSO and airplane manufacturer's specifications. It is also necessary to verify that performances are compatible for any combination of mixed brake configurations, including refurbished/overhauled and new brakes. It is essential to assure that Airplane Flight Manual braking performance and landing gear and airplane structural integrity are not adversely altered.

(3) Replacement and Modified Equipment. Replacement and modified equipment includes changes to any approved wheel and brake assemblies not addressed under paragraph 4a(2) of this AC. Consultation with the airplane manufacturer on the extent of

testing is recommended. Particular attention should be paid to potential differences in the primary brake system parameters (e.g., brake torque, energy capacity, vibration, brake sensitivity, dynamic response, structural strength, wear state, etc.). If comparisons are made to previously approved equipment, the test articles (other than the proposed parts to be changed) and conditions should be comparable, as well as the test procedures and equipment on which comparative tests are to be conducted. For wheel and brake assembly tests, the tire size, manufacturer, and ply rating used for the test should be the same and the tire condition should be comparable. For changes of any heat sink component parts, structural parts (including the wheel), friction elements, etc., it is necessary for the applicant to provide evidence of acceptable performance and compatibility with the airplane and its systems.

(a) Changes to a brake might be considered as a minor change, as long as the changes are not to the friction elements, and the proposed change cannot affect the airplane stopping performance, brake energy absorption characteristics, and/or continued airworthiness of the airplane or wheel and brake assembly (e.g., vibration and/or thermal control, brake retraction integrity, etc.). It is incumbent on the applicant to provide technical evidence justifying a minor change. Changes to a wheel assembly outside the limits allowed by the OEM's CMM should be considered a major change due to potential airworthiness issues.

(b) Past history with friction elements has indicated the necessity of on-going monitoring (by dynamometer test) of frictional and energy absorption capabilities to assure that they are maintained over the life of the airplane program. These monitoring plans have complemented the detection and correction of unacceptable deviations. The applicant should demonstrate that frictional and energy absorption capabilities of the friction elements are maintained over time.

(c) Intermixing of wheel and brake assemblies from different suppliers is generally not acceptable due to complexities experienced with different friction elements, specific brake control tuning, and other factors.

b. Brake system capability.

(1) (Ref. § 25.735(b)(1)). The system should be designed so that no single failure of the system degrades the airplane stopping performance beyond doubling the braked roll stopping distance. Failures are considered to be fracture, leakage, or jamming of a component in the system or loss of an energy source. Components of the system include all parts that contribute to transmitting the pilot's braking command to the actual generation of braking force. Multiple failures resulting from a single cause should be considered a single failure (e.g., fracture of two or more hydraulic lines as a result of a single tire failure). Sub-components within the brake assembly, such as brake discs and actuators (or their equivalents), should be considered as connecting or transmitting elements, unless it is shown that leakage of hydraulic fluid resulting from failure of the sealing elements in these sub-components within the brake assembly would not reduce the braking effectiveness below that specified in § 25.735(b)(1).

(a) In order to meet the stopping distance requirements of § 25.735(b)(1) in the event of failure of the normal brake system, it is common practice to provide an alternate brake system. The normal and alternate braking systems should be independent, being supplied by separate power sources. Following a failure of the normal system, the changeover to a second system (whether manually or by automatic means) and the functioning of a secondary power source should be effected rapidly and safely and should not involve risk of wheel locking, whether the brakes are applied or not at the time of changeover.

(b) The brake systems and components should be separated or appropriately shielded so that complete failure of the braking system(s) as a result of a single cause is minimized.

(2) (Ref. § 25.735(b)(2)). Compliance may be achieved by:

(a) showing that fluid released would not impinge on the brake, or any part of the assembly that might cause the fluid to ignite;

(b) showing that the fluid will not ignite; or

(c) showing that the maximum amount of fluid released is not sufficient to sustain a fire.

Additionally, in the case of a fire, the applicant may show that the fire is not hazardous, taking into consideration such factors as landing gear geometry, location of fire sensitive (susceptibility) equipment and installations, system status, flight mode, etc.

c. Brake controls.

(1) (Ref. § 25.735(c)(1)). The braking force should increase or decrease progressively as the force or movement applied to the brake control is increased or decreased and should respond to the control as quickly as is necessary for safe and satisfactory operation. A brake control intended only for parking need not operate progressively. There should be no requirement to select the parking brake "off" in order to achieve a higher braking force with manual braking.

(2) (Ref. § 25.735(c)(2)). When an automatic braking system is installed such that various levels of braking (e.g., low, medium, high) may be preselected to occur automatically following a touchdown, the pilot(s) should be provided with a means that is separate from other brake controls to arm and/or disarm the system prior to the touchdown.

The automatic braking system design should be evaluated for integrity and non-hazard, including the probability and consequence of insidious failure of critical components, and noninterference with the non-automatic braking system. Single failures in the automatic

braking system should not compromise non-automatic braking of the airplane. Automatic braking systems that are to be approved for use in the event of a rejected takeoff should have a single selector position, set prior to takeoff, enabling this operating mode.

d. Parking brake. (Ref. § 25.735(d)). It should be demonstrated that the parking brake has sufficient capability in all allowable operating conditions (Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) conditions) to be able to prevent the rotation of braked wheels, with the stated engine power settings, and with the airplane configuration (i.e., ground weight, c.g. position and nosewheel (or tailwheel) angle) least likely to result in skidding on a dry, level runway surface. Where reliable test data are available, substantiation by means other than airplane testing may be acceptable.

(1) For compliance with the requirement for indication that the parking brake is not fully released, the indication means should be associated, as closely as is practical, with actual application of the brake rather than the selector (control). The intent is to minimize the possibility of false indication due to failures between the point used to indicate that the parking brake is set and the brake. This requirement is separate from and in addition to the parking brake requirements associated with JAR 25.703(a)(3), Take-off warning systems.

(2) The parking brake control, whether or not it is independent of the emergency brake control, should be marked with the words "Parking Brake" and should be constructed in such a way that, once operated, it can remain in the selected position without further flightcrew attention. It should be located where inadvertent operation is unlikely or be protected, by suitable means, against inadvertent operation.

e. Antiskid system.

(1) (Ref. § 25.735(e)). No single failure in the antiskid system should result in the brakes being applied, unless braking is being commanded by the pilot. In the event of a failure, an automatic or pilot controlled, or both, means should be available to allow continued braking without antiskid.

(2) (Ref. §§ 25.735(e)(1) and (e)(2)).

(a) Failures which render the system ineffective should not prevent manual braking control by the pilot(s) and should normally be indicated. Failure of wheels, brakes, or tires should not inhibit the function of the antiskid system for unaffected wheel, brake, and tire assemblies.

(b) The antiskid system should be capable of giving a satisfactory braking performance over the full range of tire to runway friction coefficients and surface conditions, without the need for pre-flight or pre-landing adjustments or selections. The range of friction coefficients should encompass those appropriate to dry, wet, and contaminated surfaces and for both grooved and ungrooved runways.



(c) The use of the phrase "without external adjustment" is intended to imply that once the antiskid system has been optimized for operation over the full range of expected conditions for which the airplane is to be type certificated, pre-flight or pre-landing adjustments made to the equipment to enable the expected capabilities to be achieved are not acceptable. For example, a specific pre-landing selection for a landing on a contaminated, low  $\mu$  runway, following a takeoff from a dry, high  $\mu$  surface, should not be necessary for satisfactory braking performance to be achieved.

(d) It should be shown that the brake cycling frequency imposed by the antiskid installation will not result in excessive loads on the landing gear. Antiskid installations should not cause surge pressures in the brake hydraulic system that would be detrimental to either the normal or emergency brake system and components.

(e) The system should be compatible with all tire sizes and type combinations permitted and for all allowable wear states of the brakes and tires. Where brakes of different types or manufacture are permitted, compatibility should be demonstrated or appropriate means should be employed to ensure that undesirable combinations are precluded.

f. Kinetic energy capacity (Ref. § 25.735(f)). The kinetic energy capacity of each tire, wheel, and brake assembly should be at least equal to that part of the total airplane energy that the assembly will absorb during a stop, with the heat sink at a defined condition at the commencement of the stop.

(1) Calculation of Stop Kinetic Energy.

(a) The design landing stop, the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop, and the most severe landing stop brake kinetic energy absorption requirements of each wheel and brake assembly should be determined using either of the following methods:

(1) A conservative rational analysis of the sequence of events expected during the braking maneuver; or

(2) A direct calculation based on the airplane kinetic energy at the commencement of the braking maneuver.

(b) When determining the tire, wheel, and brake assembly kinetic energy absorption requirement using the rational analysis method, the analysis should use conservative values of the airplane speed at which the brakes are first applied, the range of the expected coefficient of friction between the tires and runway, aerodynamic and propeller drag, powerplant forward thrust, and, if more critical, the most adverse single engine or propeller malfunction.

(c) When determining the tire, wheel, and brake assembly energy absorption requirement using the direct calculation method, the following formula, which needs to be modified in cases of designed unequal braking distribution, should be used:

$$KE = 0.0443 WV^2/N \text{ (ft-lb.)}$$

where KE = Kinetic Energy per wheel (ft-lb.)

N = Number of main wheels with brakes

W = Airplane Weight (lb.)

V = Airplane Speed (knots)

or if SI (Metric) units are used:

$$KE = 1/2 mV^2/N \text{ (Joule)}$$

where KE = Kinetic Energy per wheel (J)

N = Number of main wheels with brakes

m = Airplane Mass (kg.)

V = Airplane Speed (m/s)

For all cases, V is the ground speed and takes into account the prevailing operational conditions. All approved landing flap conditions should be considered when determining the design landing stop energy.

These calculations should account for cases of designed unequal braking distributions. "Designed unequal braking distribution" refers to unequal braking loads between wheels that result directly from the design of the airplane. An example would be the use of both mainwheel and nosewheel brakes, or the use of brakes on a centerline landing gear supporting lower vertical loads per braked wheel than the main landing gear braked wheels. It is intended that this term should account for effects such as runway crown. Crosswind effects need not be considered.

For the design landing case, the airplane speed should not be less than  $V_{REF}/1.3$ , where  $V_{REF}$  is the airplane steady landing approach speed at the maximum design landing weight and in the landing configuration at sea level. Alternatively, the airplane speed should not be less than  $V_{SO}$ , the poweroff stall speed of the airplane at sea level, at the design landing weight, and in the landing configuration.

## (2) Heat Sink Condition at Commencement of the Stop.

(a) For the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop case, the calculation should account for the brake temperature following a previous typical landing, the effects of braking during taxi-in, the temperature change while parked, the effects of braking during taxi-out, and the additional temperature change during the takeoff acceleration phase, up to the time of brake application. The analysis may not take account of auxiliary cooling devices. Conservative assessments of typical ambient conditions and the time the airplane will be on the ground should be used.

(b) For the most severe landing stop case, the same temperature conditions and changes used for the maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop case should be assumed, except that further temperature change during the additional flight phase may be considered. The duration of this additional flight phase should be determined as the minimum practical between the takeoff and landing on the same runway, with the airplane in a configuration that would enable such a return to be made. However, should it be determined that the most severe landing stop can only reasonably occur after a more extended flight phase, this may also influence (reduce) the determined heat sink temperature.

(c) The brake temperature at the commencement of the braking maneuver should be determined using the rational analysis method. However, in the absence of such analysis, an arbitrary heat sink temperature should be used equal to the normal ambient temperature, increased by the amount that would result from a 10% maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop for the accelerate-stop case and from a 5% maximum kinetic energy accelerate-stop for landing cases.

(3) Substantiation.

(a) Substantiation is required that the wheel and brake assembly is capable of absorbing the determined levels of kinetic energy at all permitted wear states up to and including the declared fully worn limits. The term wear "state" is used to clarify that consideration should be given to possible inconsistencies or irregularities in brake wear in some circumstances, such as greater wear at one end of the heat sink than the other. Qualification related to equally distributed heat sink wear may not be considered adequate. If in-service wear distribution is significantly different from wear distribution used during qualification testing, additional substantiation and/or corrective action may be necessary.

(b) The minimum initial brakes-on speed used in the dynamometer tests should not be more than the velocity (V) used in the determination of the kinetic energy requirements of § 25.735(f). This assumes that the test procedure involved a specific rate of deceleration and, therefore, for the same amount of kinetic energy, a higher initial brakes-on speed would result in a lower rate of energy absorption. However, a brake having a higher initial brakes-on speed is acceptable if the dynamometer test showed that both the energy absorbed and the energy absorption rate required by § 25.735(f) had been achieved. Such a situation is recognized and is similarly stated in TSO-C135, which provides an acceptable means for brake approval under § 25.735(a).

(c) Brake qualification tests are not intended as a means of determining expected airplane stopping performance, but may be used as an indicator for the most critical brake wear state for airplane braking performance measurements.

g. Brake condition after high kinetic energy dynamometer stop(s). (Ref. § 25.735(g)).

(1) Following the high kinetic energy stop(s), the parking brake should be capable of restraining further movement of the airplane and should maintain this capability for the period during which the need for an evacuation of the airplane can be determined and then fully accomplished. It should be demonstrated that, with a parking brake application within a period not exceeding 20 seconds of achieving a full stop, or within 20 seconds from the time that the speed is retarded to 20 knots (or lower), in the event that the brakes are released prior to achieving a full stop (as permitted by TSO-C135), the parking brake can be applied normally and that it remains functional for at least 3 minutes.

(2) Practical difficulties associated with dynamometer design may preclude directly demonstrating the effectiveness of the parking brake in the period immediately following the high energy dynamometer stop(s). Where such difficulties prevail, it should be shown that, for the 3-minute period, no structural failure or other condition of the brake components occurs that would significantly impair the parking brake function.

(3) Regarding the initiation of a fire, it should be demonstrated that no continuous or sustained fire, extending above the level of the highest point of the tire, occurs before the 5-minute period has elapsed. Neither should any other condition arise during this same period or during the stop, either separately or in conjunction with a fire, that could be reasonably judged to prejudice the safe and complete airplane evacuation. Fire of a limited extent and of a temporary nature (e.g., those involving wheel bearing lubricant or minor oil spillage) is acceptable. For this demonstration, neither firefighting means nor coolants may be applied.

h. Stored energy systems. (Ref. § 25.735(h))

(1) Stored energy systems use a self-contained source of power, such as a pressurized hydraulic accumulator or a charged battery. This requirement is not applicable for those airplanes that provide a number of independent braking systems, including a stored energy system, but are not "reliant" on the stored energy system for the demonstration of compliance with § 25.735(b).

(2) The indication of usable stored energy should show:

(a) The minimum energy level necessary to meet the requirements of §§ 25.735 (b)(1) and (h) (i.e., the acceptable level for dispatch of the airplane);

(b) The remaining energy level; and

(c) The energy level below which further brake application may not be possible.

(3) If a gas pressurized hydraulic accumulator is to be used as the energy storage means, indication of accumulator pressure alone is not considered adequate means to indicate available stored energy, unless verification can be made of the correct precharge

pressure with the hydraulic system pressure off and the correct fluid volume with the hydraulic system pressure on. Furthermore, additional safeguards may be necessary to ensure that sufficient energy will be available at the end of the flight. Similar considerations should be made if other stored energy systems are used.

(4) A full brake application is defined as an application from brakes fully released to brakes fully applied, and back to fully released.

i. Brake wear indicators. (Ref. § 25.735(i)). The indication means should be located such that no special tool or illumination (except in darkness) is required. Expert interpretation of the indication should not be necessary.

j. Overtemperature and overpressure burst prevention. (Ref. §§ 25.735(j) and 25.731(d)). Generally, two separate types of protection should be provided: one specifically to release the tire pressure should the wheel temperature increase to an unacceptable level, and the other to release the tire pressure should the pressure become unacceptably high, particularly during the inflation process. The temperature sensitive devices are required in braked wheels only, but the pressure sensitive devices are required in all wheels.

(1) The temperature sensitive devices (e.g., fuse or fusible plugs) should be sufficient in number and appropriately located to reduce the tire pressure to a safe level before any part of the wheel becomes unacceptably hot, irrespective of the wheel orientation. The devices should be designed and installed so that once operated (or triggered) their continued operation is not impaired by the releasing gas. The effectiveness of these devices in preventing hazardous tire blowout or wheel failure should be demonstrated. It should also be demonstrated that the devices will not release the tire pressure prematurely during takeoff and landing, including during "quick turnaround" types of operation.

(2) It should be shown that the overpressurization devices, or the devices in conjunction with the tire inflation means permanently installed in the wheel, would not permit the tire pressure to reach an unsafe level regardless of the capacity of the inflation source.

(3) Both types of devices should normally be located within the structure of the wheel in positions which minimize the risk of damage or tampering during normal maintenance.

k. Compatibility. (Ref. § 25.735(k)).

(1) As part of the overall substantiation of safe and anomaly free operation, it is necessary to show that no unsafe conditions arise from incompatibilities between the brakes and brake system with other airplane systems and structures. Areas that should be explored include antiskid tuning, landing gear dynamics, tire type and size, brake combinations, brake characteristics, brake and landing gear vibrations, etc. Similarly, wheel and tire compatibility should be addressed. These issues should be readdressed when the equipment is modified.

(2) During brake qualification testing, sufficient dynamometer testing over the ranges of permissible brake wear states, energy levels, brake pressures, brake temperatures, and speeds should be undertaken to provide information necessary for systems integration.

Revised 12/12/97 per legal review

Revised 12/17/97 per additional cmnts from Mahinder.

FAA Action: Revision of Braking Systems Airworthiness Standards to Harmonize With European Airworthiness Standard for Transport Category Airplanes; NPRM -- [FAA-1999-6063](#)